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The authors have not been convinced that arguments of the propo-
nents for the inclusion of the unborn in the AFDC program are without
merit. The weight of authority as indicated by five courts of appeal
and fourteen district courts cannot be totally in error. Surely we cannot
.. .assume that Congress, at the same time that it intended to pro-
vide programs for the economic security and protection of all children,
also intended arbitrarily to leave one class of destitute children en-
tirely without meaningful protection . ..Such an interpretation of
congressional intent would be most unreasonable .... 80
Acm LOUELLA WARD
BENJAMIN A. CURRENCE
Change of Venue and Statutory Limitations
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and the dis-
trict wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law. . . ."I But the sixth amend-
ment's requirement of local juries can often be inconsistent with its re-
quirement of impartial jurors. Fortunately, states throughout the union
have enacted change of venue statutes.2
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Statutes governing change of venue generally permit a change of
venue in the place of trial from the county in which an action is properly
brought, to another county where such changes are necessary to pro-
mote the ends of justice by eliminating the effect of local prejudice
which might operate detrimentally to the rights and interests of a party
litigant. 3 Most statutes provide that a change of venue may be granted
at the request of either party to the action be it civil or criminal,4 but
80. King v. Townsend, 392 U.S. at 330.
1. The Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) held that the
Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment required that the right to jury trial
be applicable to the states.
2. See generally 56 AM. JuR. Venue § 42 (1947).
3. Id.
4. See 46 A.L.R.3d 295 (1972). Although there has been some discussion as to
the prosecutor's right to a change of venue. Under the common law it was generally
held that the jury must be drawn from and the defendant tried in the county where the
crime was committed. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 305. It was felt that this jury
1
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there seems to be no dispute that the trial judge and not the party seek-
ing the change, has the right to select the county to which a transfer
is made, within the bounds specified by statute.5 Venue statutes also
provide the manner and means of invoking the power of the trial judge
to remove an action, but it has been held the trial judge has the dis-
cretionary power to order a change of venue ex mere motu when be-
cause of existing circumstances, a fair and impartial trial cannot be had
in the county in which the action is pending.6
Change of venue statutes usually provide no meaningful standard to
guide the trial judge in granting or denying a motion for a change. Ex-
plicit in the language of most statutes is the discretionary power of the
trial judge to grant a change when it is deemed that the ends of justice
will be served." This allows great leeway for abuse of discretion. Par-
ticularly since it has been recognized that judicial reluctance to grant
a change of venue in some instances is based on the judge's inherent
refusal to admit that their court cannot provide an impartial forum.'
REASONS FOR CHANGE
Pretrial publicity (newspaper, television and radio) is the most prev-
alant reason asserted for change of venue.9 Coupled with this asser-
tion, the party seeking the change has the burden of showing that be-
cause of the pretrial publicity there is such a feeling of prejudice and
bias in the locality where he is to be tried that his right to obtain a
fair and impartial trial has been put in jeopardy.10
Jurors are not required to be totally ignorant of the facts and issues
involved in the case.1' It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his im-
pression or opinions and render a verdict based on the evidence pre-
sented at trial.' 2 For this reason, pretrial publicity whether of a routine
would be already acquainted with them. 1 W. Holdsworth A History of English Law
317 (7th ed. 1959). Therefore there developed the accused's absolute and unconditional
right to be tried in the county where the crime occurred. For this discussion see Note
Prosecution's Right to Change of Venue, 14 S. DAK. L. REv. 396 Spring '69 (1973).
5. See 50 A.L.R.3d 773 (1973). But see State v. Thompson, 266 Minn. 385, 123
N.W.2d 378 (1963).
6. Everett v. Robersonville, 8 N.C. App. 219, 174 S.E.2d 116 (1970).
7. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-84 (1969). In all civil and criminal actions . . . the
judge "may" order a copy of the record of the action removed to some adjacent county
for trial, if he is of the "opinion" that a fair trial cannot be had in said county ...
8. See Note Change of Venue in Criminal Cases: The Defendant's Right to
Specify the County of Transfer, 26 STAN. L. REv. 131, 133 (1964).
9. See Austin, Prejudice and Change of Venue, 68 DICK. L. REv. 401, 402 (1964).
10. See 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law § 422 (1965). See also Foster v. Common-
wealth, 209 Va. 297, 163 S.E.2d 565 (1963).
11. Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
12. Spies v. People of Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 168 (1887).
239
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nature, or even of a mere inflammatory nature, disseminated through
the community has generally been recognized as not constituting a suf-
ficient basis in and of itself for granting the defendant's motion for a
change. Some proof or evidence of community ill will toward the de-
fendant generally must be exhibited.' 3  However, The Supreme Court
in Sheppard v. Maxwell1 4 stated that a change of venue or continuance
must be granted whenever pretrial publicity has created a "reasonable
likelihood" that the accused will not otherwise receive a fair trial.' 5 The
Court didn't define reasonable likelihood; but the importance of this
standard is that it is not required in all cases that the accused show ac-
tual prejudice or ill will before the right to a change of venue attaches.
In some cases the courts have considered the particular pretrial pub-
licity to have been such that substantial prejudices toward the defendant
could be "anticipated" in the community, thus entitling the defendant
to a change of venue and so eliminating the necessity of having to give
proof or evidence of prejudice in the community.' This precept was
exhibited in Forsythe v. State'1 where the defendant was granted a new
trial after being convicted of manslaughter on the ground that a change
of venue should have been granted. Throughout the trial two local
newspapers with a total circulation of 40,000 in a county of 100,000
made reference to defendant's police record and repeatedly referred
to the defendant as an "ex-con" and as the county's "vice king." Local
television and radio also gave extensive coverage of the case in as many
as seventeen broadcasts daily. The court concluded that when prejudi-
cial news prior to trial is likely to prevent a fair trial, and postponing
the trial will not remove the threat, the judge should transfer the case
to another county not so permeated with publicity. "That a showing
of actual prejudice is not necessary . . .logic and experience can sub-
stitute for proof."' 8
As a matter of practicalities, the effect of pretrial publicity upon pro-
spective jurors cannot be determined with percision in any given case.
However, indicative of whether pretrial publicity is such that a defend-
ant's right to a fair and impartial trial would be jeopardized, the courts
have considered several factors in determining this potential effect: (1)
the degree to which the publicity has circulated throughout the com-
munity; (2) the degree to which the publicity or that of a like nature
has circulated in other areas to which venue could be changed; and (3)
13. 33 A.L.R.3d 17 (1970).
14. 384 U.S. 335 (1966).
15. id. at 363.
16. Supra note 13 at 33.
17. 41 Ohio Op. 2d 104, 230 N.E.2d 681 (1967).
18. Id. at 109, 230 N.E.2d at 686.
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the length of time which has elapsed from the dissemination of the pub-
licity to the date of trial.'"
People v. Jacobson20 exemplifies the first factor listed above. There
the defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree and was
sentenced to death. On appeal the defendant alleged that he was de-
nied a fair trial because of inflammatory news coverage of the crime.
One newspaper had featured defendant's incriminating statements and
a picture of defendant in a comical pose. The court in rejecting de-
fendant's contention, stated that "it was possible to select an impartial
jury, not because the coverage lacked inflammatory qualities, but be-
cause the circulation of the newspaper was limited. 21
Sorber v. State22 is indicative of the weight given by courts to the
degree to which the publicity has been circulated in areas to which the
venue can be changed. The defendant was convicted of murder and
on appeal asserted that the trial court had committed reversible error
in not granting a change of venue in that the local newspaper had ser-
ved to cause a prejudgment on the part of the prospective jurors as to
the defendant's guilt or innocence, thereby jeopardizing his right to a
fair and impartial trial. The court found that no proper showing of
change of venue was made in view of the fact that the defendant vir-
tually conceded that the newspapers in which most of the news items
about the case had appeared, had a general circulation throughout the
adjoining counties where venue could be changed.
People v. Berry23 is typical of the third factor. Berry after being
convicted of burglary maintained that the trial court had committed er-
ror in not granting a motion for change of venue based on alleged pre-
trial publicity. The court, after noting that the motion was not filed
nor the trial held until approximately four months after the alleged pub-
licity had been published thought that this delay could be considered
as a sufficient time lapse to dissipate any feeling of prejudice whether
real or imagined; and it could not be said that the trial court lacked
any reasonable grounds whatsoever to believe that the defendant could
not get a fair and impartial trial in the county.
19. 33 A.L.R.3d 17 (1970). Other factors enumerated:
(1) The care and ease encountered in the selection of a jury;
(2) The familiarity with the publicity complained of and its resultant effect if any
upon the prospective jurors or the trial jurors;
(3) The challenges exercised by the defendant in the selection of the jury, both
those preemptory and those for cause;
(4) The connection of government officials with the release of the publicity;
(5) The severity of the offense charged; and
(6) The particular size of the area from which the venire is drawn.
20. 63 Cal. 2d 319, 405 P.2d 555, 46 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1965).
21. Id. at 325, 405 P.2d at 559, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
22. 225 Miss. 436, 76 So. 2d 234 (1967).
23. 37 Ill. 2d 329, 226 N.W.2d 591 (1967).
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Aside from adverse pretrial publicity as a reason for change, courts
have also recognized that ill feeling may be generated in the community
against a particular defendant if he is a member of a certain cultural
or ethnic group. Thus in Frazier v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz
County,2 4 defendant, who had been identified as a "hippie," was in-
dicted on five counts of murder and moved for a change of venue on
the ground that an impartial trial could not be had in the county. When
the motion was denied, defendant sought a writ of mandamus to compel
the respondent court to grant the relief. In granting relief, the court
noted that throughout the county there was a deep seated antagonism
toward hippies.
There may not be, as the trial court found hostility toward this parti-
cular defendant as an individual, so long as there is hostility towards
the group or subculture with which he is identified he runs a very real
risk of being judged not for what he has done but for what he is, or
what he appears to be.25
Though murder and rape are the types of crimes most frequently in-
volved when a court grants a change of venue,2 6 the crimes of members
of a minority group do not have to be as serious as murder and rape
in order to produce prejudice,2 7 therefore invoking the right to a
change. This was exemplified in People v. Lucas28 where the defend-
ant, a black, was indicted for practicing medicine without a license. A
change of venue was granted and the court in reference to the defend-
ant's race, stated that this fact, "with the nature of his occupation, has
attracted unusual public attention. 29
Finally, as a reason for change, it has been recognized that there may
be more hostility toward persons accused of certain crimes in some
counties than in others; for example, jurors in rural counties where
murders are relatively uncommon may react more emotionally and un-
favorably toward a defendant accused of a brutal murder than might
urban jurors,30 therefore preventing an impartial trial.
LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY STATUTES
Some statutes authorizing change of venue impose limitations such
as allowing only one change of venue 3 a change to an adjacent32 or
24. 5 Cal. 3d 287, 486 P.2d 694, 95 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1971).
25. Id. at 294, 486 P.2d at 699, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
26. Supra note 9.
27. ld.
28. 131 Misc. 664, 228 N.Y.S. 31 (Sup. Ct., 1928).
29. Id. at 665, 228 N.Y.S. at 32.
30. Supra note 8.
31. See Wis. STAT. ch. 956.03 (1967).
32. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-84 (1969).
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adjoining33 county or to an adjoining district or parish. 4 However,
some courts have recognized that even statutory limits on the possible
places of transfer may be transcended, if it can be established that a
fair trial cannot be obtained in any locality permitted by statute, since
the statute then must bow to the constitutional right to a fair trial by
an impartial jury.35 It has also been held that the right to change the
place of trial is based upon the constitutional right of an accused to a
fair and impartial trial and exists wholly apart from the statute, which
merely provides the procedure for enforcing the right."
This reasoning seems to be the most logical approach to such statu-
tory limitations and more consistent with the purpose of allowing a
change of venue. Especially in the light of the fact that many com-
munities are served by the same newspaper, television and radio sta-
tions; and economic and social ties are so intertwined that they are vir-
tually a single community. In such cases the same grounds (adverse
publicity, prejudice, etc.) that existed for transferring the case may
exist in the place of transfer. 7
In State of Louisiana v. Rideau 8 defendant was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death. The conviction was upheld by the Supreme
Court of Louisiana but the United States Supreme Court reversed the
conviction39 because the jury had been drawn from a community ex-
posed to a television broadcast of defendant being questioned by the
local sheriff where the defendant confessed to the murder. On remand
the prosecutor moved for a change of venue outside the range of the
television station. Granting the motion would have required trans-
ferring the case out of the parish, therefore the trial judge denied the
motion on the ground that under Louisiana Law he was without author-
ity to transfer the case to any parish other than one in his district.
On appeal the Supreme Court of Louisiana held:
. . . that a change of venue is primarily to insure the rights of the
accused to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, as guaranteed under
the Bill of Rights to !the United States constitution and section 9 of
Article I of the Louisiana Constitution, and when procedural legisla-
tion setting out the rules of governing such change conflict with these
33. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. Ch. 277 § 51 (1956). The words "adjacent" and
"adjoining" have been considered equivalent to each other by some courts. See Grooms
v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. 319, 50 S.W.2d 370 (1899).
34. See LOUISIANA STAT. ANN. R.S. § 15.293 (1950).
35. State v. Rideau, 246 La. 451, 165 So. 2d 282 (1964).
36. State ex rel. Ricco v. Briggs, 198 Ore. 413, 255 P.2d 1055 (1953).
37. Liber v. Flor, 160 Colo. 7, 415 P.2d 33 (1966).
38. 242 La. 431, 137 So. 2d 283 (1962).
39. Rideau v. State of Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
243
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constitutional rights to the extent the legislative enactment deprive
an accused of the process of law then they must yield.40
In an action to determine whether a second change of venue should
be granted in spite of a statute allowing only one change of venue; the
Supreme Court of Indiana in State v. Porter Circuit Court4' held that
it is the duty of the judiciary to provide to every accused a public trial
by an impartial jury, even though to do so the court must grant a second
change of venue and thus contravene the general legislative policy of
granting only one change of venue from the county.42 The Indiana
Supreme Court seemed to have placed great weight on the fact that
the state and the defendant had agreed that a second change was nec-
essary and that the Constitution of Indiana itself guaranteed a trial by
an impartial jury.
No case was found where the United States Supreme Court decided
a case involving a due process attack on a statute involving one of the
limitations discussed above. But in one case the Court declared that
a statute allowing only one change of venue is not unconstitutional on
its face as violative of due process where construed by the highest court
of the state to permit a second change of venue after an impartial jury
in the county to which venue is first changed cannot be obtained.43 By
way of implication, this declaration by the Court can be said to mean
that if such statutes are applied and interpreted strictly in disregard of
the right to a fair and impartial trial, due process issues may arise.
One recent writer 44 has advocated that the defendant should have
the right to select the transferee county if his change of venue motion
is successful; and that unless a strong state interest requires denying
the defendant this right, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is
applicable.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions states that the govern-
ment cannot condition the receipt of a benefit upon the surrender of
a constitutional right or penalize a person for exercising such right, un-
less the condition or penalty is justified by a substantial public inter-
est.45  In applying this doctrine to present change of venue statutes,
the writer demonstrates that in certain instances the defendant, rather
than run the risk of transfer to a county where there is less likelihood of
obtaining a fair trial, may surrender his constitutional right to a change
of venue and remain in the original forum despite prejudicial condi-
tions.
40. Supra 246 La. at 455, 165 So. 2d at 284.
41. 239 Ind. 637, 159 N.E.2d 713 (1957).
42. id.
43. 366 U.S. at 722.
44. Supra note 8.
45. Id.
7
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Whether the doctrine is applicable or will be applied to change of
venue statutes in future cases remains to be seen; but it can be safely
said that unless the various legislatures take some action to repeal or
amend change of venue statutes that impose limitations which have the
effect of circumventing the purpose of allowing change, most courts will
feel bound by the language of the statutes.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in its pronouncement of the "reasonable likeli-
hood" test as the measure of evidentiary showing warranting a change
of venue, obviously realizes that in many instances such safeguards as
voir dire examination of prospective jurors does not detect prejudice
or the effect of pretrial publicity on a given community. It appears
that the Court constructs a very liberal test for insuring the constitu-
tional right to a fair and impartial trial. However, the writer submits
that change of venue laws that impose limitations on the place or num-
ber of changes do not enhance this given constitutional right. In spite
of the policy pronounced by legislatures, the trial judge in granting a
change of venue must operate with a view of carrying out the guarantee
enunciated in the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution.
CURTIS 0. HARRIS
In the Matter of: Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hospital, Inc.:
Impasse for Regulation of Hospital Construction in North Carolina?
In January, 1973, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
1971 certificate of need law was void because its application to Aston
Park Hospital, Inc. resulted in a deprivation of liberty without due
process of law, established a monopoly in existing hospitals, and
granted exclusive privileges to existing hospitals in violation of the Con-
stitution of North Carolina.' Prior to Aston Park, certificate of need
laws had been challenged in courts in California2 and New York,3 and
in both cases, the laws were upheld.
The certificate of need legislation was a regulatory measure enacted
1. In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d
729 (1973).
2. Simon v. Cameron, 337 F. Supp. 1380 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
3. Attoma v. State Dep't of Social Welfare, 26 App. Div. 2d 12, 270 N.Y.S.2d 167
(1966).
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